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RATIONALE OF THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S
CASE IN INDIANA
By ADDISON M. DOWLING*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of 4rticle
Perhaps no rule of law has tortured the mind of the legal
profession more than the Rule in Shelley's Case, with the
natural result that students fear it, lawyers view it with considerable misapprehension and the courts apply it with some
reluctance. It is not uncommon for courts to question the
advisability of applying the Rule1 nor for legislatures to
*Professor of Law at Indiana Law School.
1 "That it is not a rule of construction, but of property, which had its origin
in feudal tenure, and was first adopted to secure the lords the profits, rights
and perquisites incident to inheritances. It is at best a mere artificial technicality, the maintenance of which, is to displace the clear intention of the testator
and produce injustice, when justice ought to prevail. It has met with denunciation and severe criticism from the ablest judicial minds in England and this
country, till it has become the practice of courts whenever the question arises,
to hold that the particular case then under consideration does not come
within the rule in Shelley's Case."
(Dissenting opinion) McCray v. Lipp
(1871), 35 Ind. 116, 121; Waters v. Lyon (1894), 141 Ind. 170, 174-175, 40
N. E. 662.
Walsh in his treatise in Anglo-American Law (1932), p. 246, says: "It
is difficult to understand how any court can be induced to tolerate as a rule
of construction which so obviously defeats the real intent of the grantor or
devisor."
"It may be remarked that whatever reasons may have once existed for it
in England have, even there, long since ceased, and no good reason is perceived for its incorporation into the legal policy of this country. It was
doubtless introduced into many of the other states as into this, as a part of
the Common Law, without discussion or question as to its propriety, but it
has been abrogated in many of them by statute (2 Wash. on R. P. 276 and
note). Its propriety as a rule of law, in this state, is seriously doubted, and
it may be regretted that the attention of the legislature has not been directed
to the propriety of its repeal, as its only effect and more particularly in its
application to devisees, is to defeat the real intention of testators." Siceloff
v. Redman (1866), 26 Ind. 251, 259.
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abrogate the Rule or abolish it.2 The Rule, however, has
been adopted and frequently applied by the Courts of Indiana3 and recognized as established law in this state. 4 The
legal profession might admit that the rule itself is not difficult
to comprehend and perhaps be equally willing to admit that
its application in many instances causes considerable mental
discomfort. It is thought that despite the antiquity of the
Rule 5 and the several articles which have been written onthe subject 6 a rationale of the Rule within limited boundaries
2The thirty-three states which have enacted statutes directed to the abrogation of the Rule are as follows:
"Ala. Code (Michie, 1928) Sec. 6907; Ariz. Code (Struckmeyer, 1928)
Sec. 2769; Cal. Civ. Code (Dearing, 1931) Sec. 779; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930)
Sec. 5002; D. C. Code (1929) tit. 25, Sec. 133;.Ga. Code (1926) Sections 3659,
3660; Idaho Comp. Stat. (1919) Sec. 5344; Iowa Code (1931) Sections 10059,
10060; Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1923) c. 22, Sec. 256; Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1930)
Sec. 2345; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 87, See. 12; Md. Ann. Code (Bagby,
1924) art. 93, Sec. 342; Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 184, Sec. 5; Mich. Comp.
Laws (1929) Sec. 12948; Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) Sec. 8058; Miss. Code
Ann. (1930) See. 2114; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) Sec. 3110; Mont. Rev. Code
(Choate, 1921) Sec. 6741; N. H. Pub Laws (1926) c. 297, Sec. 8; N. J. Comp.
State. (1910) p. 1921; N. M. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1929) Sec. 117-109;
N. Y. Real Prop. Law (1909) c. 51 Sec. 54; N.D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913)
Sec. 5322; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1932) See. 10578; Okla. Comp. Stat. Ann.
(Bunn, 1921) Sec. 8420; Ore. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 10-526; R.I. Gen. Laws
(1923) c. 296, Sec. 4248; S.C. Acts 1924, p. 1140; S.D. Comp. Laws (1929)
Sec. 329; Tenn. Code (1932) Sec. 7600; Va. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 5152;
W. Va. Code (1931) c. 36, art. 1, Sec. 14; Wis. Stat. (1929) Sec. 230.28." 45
Harvard Law Review, 573 (N).
3Thd Rule in Shelley's Case is a rule of the Common Law, and as the
Common Law has been adopted in this State by statute, the rule is binding
upon the courts as a rule of real property in Indiana. Sorden v. Gatewood
(1848), 1 Ind. 107; Doe v. Jackman (1854), 5 Ind. 283; Hull v. Beals (1864),
23 Ind. 25; Siceloff v. Redman (1866), 26 Ind. 251; McCray v. Lipp (1871),
35 Ind. 116; Andrews v. Spurlin (1871), 35 Ind. 262; Nelson v. Davis (1871),
35 Ind. 474; Gonzales v. Barton (1873), 45 Ind. 295; Maxwell v. Featherstone (1882), 83 Ind. 339; Shimer v. Mann (1884), 99 Ind. 190; Fountain
County Coal Co. v. Beckleheimer (1885), 102 Ind. 76, 1 N.E. 202, Chamberlain v. Runkle (1901), 28 Ind. App. 599, 63 N.E. 486; Snyder v. Greendale
Land Co. (1911), 48 Ind. App. 178, 91 N.E. 819.
4 "That the rule in Shelley's Case is recognized as law, and a rule of
property in this State is too well settled to admit of controversy." Taney
v. Fahnley (1890), 126 Ind. 88, 89, 25 N. E. 882.
5 See Note 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) p. 977.
6Application of the Rule in Shelley's Case, 28 Law Quarterly Review 148
(1912) ; Application of the Rule in Shelley's Case Where the Limitations are
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might be of interest and benefit to the reader. Since there
appears to be slight unanimity in the application of the Rule
among the various states where the Rule obtains, it is obviously necessary to limit the scope of this article principally
to Indiana law. Extended consideration of the Rule in other
states would only invite confusion.
Facts in Shelley's Case
The following is a brief summary of the facts and events
which were connected with the famous case of Wolfe v. Shelley (1581), 1 Coke 93 b, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, better known
as "Shelley's Case":
Edward Shelley and Joan, his wife, were seized of a special
tail estate.7 Said Edward and Joan had two sons, Henry and
Richard. Joan died. Henry married and a daughter, Mary,
was born unto him. Henry died then leaving his father, Edward, his brother, Richard, his daughter, Mary, and his wife,
who was enceinte, surviving him. Edward Shelley, the father
of Richard, suffered a common recovery8 (the purpose of
Equitable or Where there is an Executory Trust, 8 Illinois Law Review 153
(1913) ; Simonton, The Rule in Shelley's Case in West Virginia, 26 W. Va.
Law Quarterly 178 (1920); Rhea, The Rule in Shelley's Case in Texas, 3
Texas Law Review 109 (1924); Carson, The Rule in Shelley's Case in
Penna., 64 University Penna. Law Review 141 (1915); Notes: 27 Law Review
673 (1914) ; 10 Columbia Law Review 62 (1910); 62 University Penna. Law
Review 137 (1913); 5 Illinois Law Review 51 (1910); 1 California Law
Review 279 (1913); 29 L. R. A. (N.S.) 963; 5 Indiana Law Journal 586
(1930).
7 "Fee tail estates (now abolished by statute in Indiana, 56-138 Burns
1933) are estates of inheritance which, instead of descending to heirs generally,
go to the heirs of the donee's body, which means his lawful issue, his children,
and through them to his grandchildren in a direct line, so long as his posterity
endures in a regular order and course of descent, and upon the extinction of
such issue the estate determines. Estates tail are either general or special,
according to whether the limitation is to the heirs of the donee's body generally
or to certain specified heirs, coming ,within that description, to the exclusion
of others." 21 C. J. 931, 932, Sections 43, 45.
8 "A Common recovery was a judgment recovered in a fictitious suit,
brought against the tenant of the freehold, in consequence of a default made
by the person who is last vouched to warranty in the suit, which recovery,
being a supposed adjudication of the right, binds all persons, and vests a
free and absolute fee simple in the recoveror." Cyclopedic Law Dictionary.
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which was to defeat the entail) which suit gave rise to the
following estate "to the use of himself (Edward) for life,
to the use of others for 24 years, and then to the use of the
heirs male of the body of said Edward, lawfully begotten,
and the heirs of the body of such heirs male lawfully begotten,
and for default of such issue over." (In substance this provision is equivalent to saying "to Edward for, life, remainder
over to others for 24 years, remainder over to Edward's heirs
in fee.") Then Edward died. Henry Shelley, Jr. was born.
Richard Shelley took possession of the property held by his
father and leased it to one Wolfe. Later Henry Shelley, Jr.
entered said premises and attempted to oust Richard's lessee,
Wolfe. Wolfe, claiming through Richard, brought suit against
Henry, Jr. After a three day argument by counsel of each
side the Queen, says Coke, "ordered Sir Thomas Bromley,
Lord Chancellor of England, to assemble all the justices of
England before him and, upon conference had between themselves touching the said questions, to give their resolutions
and judgments thereof." After considerable study and deliberation it was decided that the plaintiff, Wolfe, should take
nothing by his bill and the judicial body determined that under
the facts the following well established rule should be applied.
Statements of the Rule

It is a rule in law when the ancestor, by any gift or conveyance, takes an estate of freehold, and in the same gift or
conveyance an estate is limited, either mediately or immediately, to his heirs in fee or in. tail; that always in such cases
"the heirs" are words of limitation of the estate, and not
words of purchase.
Coke described the Rule in these terms:
"When the ancestor, by any gift or conveyance, takes an estate of
freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance, an estate is limited mediately or immediately to the heirs in fee or tail, that always in such
cases 'the heirs' are words describing the extent or quality of the
estate conveyed and not words designating the persons who are to
take it."
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Preston on Estates, p. 263, as cited in Baker v. Scott, 62
Ill. 86, offers the following elaborate definition of the Rule:
"When a person takes an estate of- freehold, legally 'or equitably,
under a deed, will or other writing, and afterward in the same deed,
will or writing, there is a limitation by way of remainder, with or
without the interposition of any other estate, of an interest of the same
quality, as legal or equitable, to his heirs generally or his heirs of
his body by that name in deeds or writings of conveyance, and by
that or some such name in wills, and as a class or denomination of
persons to take in succession, from generation to generation, the limitation to the heirs will entitle the person or ancestor himself to the
estate or interest imparted by that limitation."

Indiana courts in stating the Rule have used similar phraseology to that employed in the foregoing definitions. 9
Reasons for the Rule
Contrary to popular conception, the Rule which was applied
in Shelley's case, existed long before Shelley's time 0 and had
become a ruling precedent which is believed to have been applied as early as 1325, in a case cited in Perrin v. Blake
(1770), 4 Burr. 2579, 10 Eng. Rul. Cas. 689. The Rule
did not apparently attract general attention until 1590, but
since that time has been the subject of great controversy. Due
to the attacks made upon the Rule which challenge its right
to exist it might be well at least to do lip service to various
reasons for its origin.
The following theories which offer possible reasons for
the Rule have been stated by Frank Goodwin in his Treatise
on the Law of Real Property (1905), p. 186:
Theory No. 1: It was common in the reign of Henry III for
fathers to make conveyances to the eldest son for the purpose of depriv-

ing the lord of certain of his fruits of tenure, i. e. feudal incidents.
If, then, a tenant holding by knight service should convey to his eld9

Doe v. Jackman (1854), 5 Ind. 283, 284; Andrews v. Spurlin (1871), 35
Ind. 262, 265; Waters v. Lyon (1894), 141 Ind. 170, 175, 40 N.E. 662; Teal
v. Richardson (1902), 160 Ind. 119, 120, 66 N. E. 435.
10 See Note 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) p. 977.
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est son a fee simple, thereby making the son take as a purchaser, the
son, being under age, thereafter at the death of his father would not
be liable to wardship, because he held by purchase and not be descent.
(Wardship entitled the lord to take tribute.) The statute of Marfbridge (1267) was passed to defeat this practice, *vhich was called
collusion; and the first of these theories concerning the origin of the
Rule in Shelley's Case is that it was the above practice which caused
the statute of Marlbridge to declare that in the case of a limitation to
A for life, remainder to his heirs, the heirs should not be allowed to
take by purchase, but that they must take by descent.
Theory No. 2: There was a time when, by a limitation to "A and
his heirs," the heir was a purchaser, and of course his consent had to be
obtained to 'the alienation of the fee, as A had but a life estate. The
power of alienation against the heir was accomplished, without any legislation, during the reign of Henry III. The second theory is that
before this authority was acquired the courts saw no difference between
a gift to A for life, remainder to his heirs, and a gift to A and his
heirs. Hence the Rule in Shelley's Case.
Theory No. 3: Relates to abeyance. It is shocking to the common
law mind that the inheritance should ever be in abeyance. Now, in
a gift to A for life, remainder to his heirs, the grantor has given away
the inheritance, but since A has no heirs while he lives, the inheritance
would have to be in abeyance, because although given away, there is
no one to take it; and this must be so unless A himself can take it.
Hence the Rule in Shelly's Case.
Theory No. 4: The Rule in Shelley's Case gets the property into
the market one generation earlier, for if A takes a fee simple in possession the property is immediately marketable, which fact has caused
the Rule in Shelley's Case to hold its own down through the ages.
Theory No. 5: The only way in which two or more persons can
at the common law take one estate as purchasers is to take together
as joint tenants or tenants in common. Significance must be given to
the plurality of the word "heirs." It is not intended that they shall
take togeher as joint tenants, or tenants in common. Therefore they
cannot take as purchasers. Hence the Rule in Shelley's Case.

II.

EXPLANATION OF THE RULE
Formal Statement A4nalyzed

Before attempting an explanation of the Rule in a running
statement it would seem advisable to treat each important
part of the Rule separately. Therefore the following formal
statement will be broken down into ten parts, each part
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assigned a separate heading with a brief explanation accompanying it.
It is a rule of law,/when the ancestor,/by any gift or
conveyance,/takes an estate of freehold,/and in the same gift
or conveyance,/an estate is limited/either mediately or immediately/to his heirs/in fee or tail,/that always in such cases
the word "heirs" is a word of limitation and not a word of
purchase.
(1)
"It is a rule of law"
The Rule in Shelley's Case must not be looked upon as
a rule of construction but as a positive rule of real property
law. Harsh applications of the Rule, which sometimes defeat
the real intention of the grantor or testator, 11 are more than
persuasive to show that the Rule is not one of construction.
It is true that the courts will construe the wording of a deed
or will but such construction is primarily for the purpose of
determining the real intention of the maker, and once the
intention is established then the Rule is applied.
(2)
"When the ancestor"
When the Rule speaks of the ancestor, reference is made to
the first taker. It is the ancestor who profits by the application of the Rule as he receives an estate in fee, and in him the
line of inheritance is established, his heirs to take the estate,
provided, of course, he does not grant or devise the fee before his death. On the other hand if the Rule is not invoked,
the ancestor takes only a life estate and a vested remainder
is limited to those persons named as remaindermen.
(3)
"By any gift or conveyance"
The Statute of Frauds requires the transfer of lands to be
in writing and when the Rule speaks of "gift or conveyance"
any legitimate written transfer is contemplated.
(4)
"Takes an estate of freehold"
The Rule is only operative when the estate taken by the
ancestor is such that the word "heirs" will have a sufficient
11 Biggs v. McCarty, (1882), 86 Ind. 352, 44 Am. Rep. 320.
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estate to operate upon. In other words the freehold estate
in the ancestor is absolutely necessary in order that an inheritable estate can vest in the first taker. As a practical matter
the freehold contemplated by the Rule is generally a life
estate in possession, but it has been held that the freehold need
not be one in possession. Also an estate in a trustee in trust
for the use of others during their joint lives may come within
the rule. Likewise a determinable life estate "to A so long
as she remains my widow," (the possibility that such an'
estate may terminate in the lifetime of the widow and before
there can be an heir, being immaterial) has been held a sufficient freehold estate to qualify under the Rule. 12
(5)
"A4nd in the same 'gift or conveyance"
This phase of the Rule merely provides that in order for
the Rule to operate both the freehold estate in the ancestor
and the remainder in fee or tail must be created in the same
instrument. In other words the freehold estate cannot be
granted in a deed and the remainder devised in a will, but
both estates must be created in either the deed or will. 13
(6)
"AIn estate is limited"
The estate referred to in this clause is the vested estate
which the remaindermen would take in the event the Rule
could not be invoked. Of course if the Rule is applied the
estate limited merges with the freehold estate of the ancestor,
12 Ferris v..Ferris, 9 Ont. Rep. 324.

Curtis v. Price (1805), 12 Ves. Jr.'89, 53 Eng. Rep. 35.
13 "When the life estate is created by one instrument and the remainder
by another, this is evidence of a different intention with reference to the disposition of the remainder, than where the two estates are created- by the same
instrument. Therefore a different effect must be given to the words of limitation. It is a mistake to say that one may do indirectly by two instruments
what he cannot do by one under the Rule in Shelley's Case; for as it is
impossible to create a life estate followed by gift in remainder to the whole
line of the life tenant's heirs in succession in a single instrument, so it is
impossible to create such an estate by two instruments, or by any number
of instruments. If it is desired to have the heirs take by descent the ancestor
must have the fee, for otherwise a descendible estate is not created. This
is not due to the so-called technical rule in Shelley's Case, but to the nature
of the estate of inheritance, which cannot at the same time begin in a person
and descend to him from an ancestor. It is of course conceivable that a new
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vesting the fee in him. The terms limited and limitations
have a variety of meanings and are often confused, but the
term limited as used in the Rule refers to an estate in the
same property created or contemplated by the conveyance to
be enjoyed after the first estate, granted or devised, expires.
(7)
"Either mediately or immediately"
The terms "mediately or immediately" under the Rule have
reference to the time when the remainderman is entitled to
possession. In case the Rule is not applied, the remainderman
is entitled to possession instantly (immediately) upon the
death of the ancestor. If possession is to be taken at a
future time, which is the situation where there is an intervention of an intermediate estate between the life estate and
the remainder, the term "mediately" would be appropriate to
show a future possession. It should be noted that in Shelley's
Case there was an intermediate estate for 24 years which
meant that the estate in remainder was limited "mediately"
to the heirs. 14
(8)
"To his heirs"
Where there exists a remainder over to "his heirs" the Rule
contemplates that the word "heirs" when used in the technical
or legal sense means the heirs of the ancestor. The result
being that a line of inheritance is set up in the ancestor, and
by virtue of such an inheritable estate being created in him,
the Rule provides that the ancestor shall take a fee.
(9)
"In fee or tail"
In order that the Rule may operate it must be possible for
the life estate in the first taker to merge with the estate in
kind of an estate might be created by statute which could begin in A, and
then descend not to his heirs, but to the heirs of an ancestor as if the estate
had come to A by descent, but such a statute has never been passed." 29
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1007.
14 In the event an intermediate estate is interposed between the life estate
in A and the remainder in the heirs of A, e. g. "To A for life, remainder to
B for 24 years, remainder to A's heirs in fee," A takes a fee simple estate
subject to B's estate for 24- years, not to be executed in possession until the
determination of the intervening estate. Such intervening estate does not
prevent the Rule from operating.
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remainder which merger would give rise to a vested inheritable estate in the ancestor. The basis of such an estate of
inheritance is the fee simple or fee tail estate in remainder.
(10)

"That always in such cases the word 'heirs' is a word
of limitation and not 14 word of purchase."
Since the operation of the Rule depends upon the construction of the words which create the remainder, it is important
to know the difference between words of "limitation" and
words of "purchase." It is axiomatic that the Rule is not a
rule of construction, but in order for the Rule to operate the
courts must first construe and interpret the wording of the
instrument. That is, it is necessary for the court to decide
whether the remaindermen take by descent from the ancestor
or by way of purchase from the testator or grantor. If they
take by descent the word "heirs" will be construed as a word
of limitation and the Rule will be invoked, but if they are to
take directly from the testator or grantor then the word
"heirs" must be construed as a word of purchase and the Rule
will not be applied. As Coke points out in his definition of
the Rule the word "limitation" as used in the Rule must be
understood as a word of "boundary", i. e. a -word describing
the extent or quality of the estate conveyed to the ancestor,
while the word "purchase" must be understood as designating the persons who are to take the estate "descriptio personarum."
Restatement of the Rule
By bringing the foregoing fragments of the Rule together
the Rule might be stated in the following simple manner:
It has become a positive rule of property law that when
a grantor or devisor creates an estate for life in A and in
the same deed or will also creates in A's heirs a remainder in
fee or fee tail (which estate is to take effect in possession
immediately or after an intervening estate), the word "heirs"
(if used in the technical sense) is to be interpreted as a term
denoting the extent of the ancestor's (A's) estate and not
as a term designating those who are to take as remaindermen.
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Merger and Exceptions to the Rule
Under the Rule a grant to "A for life with a remainder to
A's heirs in fee" vests a fee simple estate in A. It would be
most pertinent to ask, "Why does A not take a life estate and
the heirs of A take the fee simple?"' 15 To answer, legally,
a living man cannot have heirs (nemo est heres viventis) but
can have only apparent or presumptive heirs.' 6 Therefore,
since the law favors an early vesting of the fee, A's life estate
and the remainder in fee, to persons who are unable to take
during A's life, (i. e. A's heirs) merge, vesting the fee in A.
At Common Law in order to creat a fee simple estate the
word "heirs" or similar words denoting an estate of inheritance were indispensable, e. g. "to A and his heirs." Under
the Statute De Donis (1285), to create a fee tail, (which
estate has been abolished by statute in the State of Indiana) 17,
the term "heirs of the body" had to be employed, e. g. "to A
and the heirs of his body" otherwise in each instance only
a life estate was created. 18
15 If the Rule were abolished the probable effect would be to create a life
estate in the ancestor with a contingent fee in the remainderman.
16 "It is said that no on can have an heir during his life, and, therefore,
that the words 'his heirs' mean children. The premise is true, but the conclusion does not follow. A devise to a man and his heirs vests an estate of
inheritance which will go to the legal heirs, whether they are children or
other kinsmen. At Common Law the word 'heir' or 'heirs' was the strongest
term that could be used to create a fee, and in many cases was indispensibly
necessary to create such an estate. It cannot, therefore, be logically possible
that because the term 'heirs' is used the devise is limited to children and the
estate of the first taker cut down to an estate for life. If this conclusion be
just, then for many centuries courts and authors have given a radically erroneous meaning to the words 'his heirs'." Shimer v. Mann (1884), 99 Ind. 190,
199; Fountain Co. Coal Co. v. Beckleheimer (1885), 102 Ind. 76, 77, 1 N. E.
202; Outland v. Bowen (1888), 115 Ind. 150, 158, 17 N. E. 281; Tinder v.
Tinder (1891), 131 Ind. 381, 383, 30 N. E. 1077.
17 56-138 Burns 1933 (1 R. S. 1852, Ch; 23, See. 36, p. 232) provides:
"Estates tail are abolished; and any estate which, according to the Common
Law, would be adjudged a fee tail, shall hereafter be adjudged a fee simple;
and if no valid remainder shall be limited thereon, shall be a fee simple
absolute." Tipton v. LaRose (1867), 27 Ind. 484; Granger v. Granger (1896),
147 Ind. 95, 107, 44 N. E. 189, 46 N. E. 80; Teal v. Richardson (1902), 160
Ind. 119, 120, 66 N. E. 435; Gibson v. Brown (1916), 62 Ind. App. 460, 472,
110 N. E. 716, 112 N. E. 894.
18 At Common Law a grant which omitted the word "heirs" conveyed only
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Now, when the Rule is applied, the merger of the two
estates has the effect of creating an estate to "A and his
heirs", which is readily recognized as a fee simple.
It is to be conceded that when the life estate of the ancestor
is capable of merging with the fee in the heirs, the Rule may
be applied, but it is equally true that where the two estates
cannot coalesce, the Rule cannot be applied. The following
situations constitute some of the exceptions to the Rule in
Shelley's Case because merger is impossible:
(1) A merger of the estates can only arise when the particular estate, i. e. the ancestor's estate, is a freehold (life, life
pur autre vie or fee tail) otherwise the estate in remainder
would have no estate to operate upon.
In order to effect a merger of the two estates both
(2)
must be of the same quality, i. e. both legal or both equitable,
otherwise they would not coalesce and each would retain its
own characteristics and identity. Therefore an estate to X
in trust for A for life with a remainder over to A's heirs
would give rise to an equitable estate in A and a legal estate
in A's heirs. Under the rules of property law the two estates
could not merge and consequently the Rule would not apply.
(3) There may be no merger of estates where an estate
is given to several persons for life in succession with a remainder to "their heirs." "Their heirs" means only the heirs
of the surviving life tenant, and not their heirs generally.
a life estate. This rule prevailed until the following statute was passed, 1
R. S. 1852 Ch. 23, Sec. 14, p. 232, 56-105 Burns 1933 which provides: "It
shall not be necessary to use the words 'heirs and assigns of the grantee' to
create in the grantee an estate of inheritance, and if it be the intention of
the grantor to convey any lesser estate, it shall be so expressed in the deed."
Cases prior to 1852: Nelson v. Davis (1871), 35 Ind. 474, Nicholson v. Caress
(1877), 59 Ind. 39; Fountain County Coal Co. v. Beckleheimer (1885), 102
Ind. 76, 1 N. E. 202; Lamb v. Medsker (1905), 35 Ind. App. 662, 74 N. E.
1012. Cases after Passage of 1852 Act: Chamberlain v. Runkle (1901), 28
Ind. App, 599, 63 N. E. 486; Adams v. Merrill (1909), 45 Ind. App.
315, 85 N. E. 114, 87 N. E. 36; Mulvane v. Rude (1896), 146 Ind. 476,
45 N. E. 659; Fenstermaker v. Holman (1901), 158 Ind. 71, 62 N. E. 699.
Rule as to Wills: See: 7-704, 705 Burns 1933 and cases cited.
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(4) Nor can there be a merger when a contingency
operates upon the remainder, viz., "To A for life, remainder
to A's heirs, if A shall survive B." No merger here unless
and until B dies, because inheritance cannot vest.
(5)
No merger where the heirs take different estates than
they would by descent, viz., "To A for life, remainder to
heirs of his body, their heirs and assigns, so long as they (the
heirs) remain residents of Indiana." Here the conveyance
limits the estate to those heirs who remain in Indiana and
defeats the estate of those who move out of the State.
(6)
Where the word "heirs" is construed as meaning
children or designating a person*or a class of persons who
may take as remaindermen.

III.

APPLICATION OF RULE

Rules of Construction
As heretofore stated the Rule in Shelley's Case is not to be
considered as a rule of construction but as a rule of property
law, 19 such principle sometimes having the effect of defeating
the intention of the grantor or testator. 20 Indiana courts have
19 The Rule is not one of construction, as a matter of fact, it takes effect
regardless of the donors' intention, and frequently in direct contravention
thereof. It is a rule of property law. Shimer v. Mann (1884), 99 Ind. 190;
Fountain County Coal Co. v. Beckleheimer (1885), 102 Ind. 76, 1 N. E. 202;
Hochstedler v. Hochstedler (1886), 108 Ind. 506, 9 N. E. 467; Allen v. Craft
(1886), 109 Ind. 476, 9 N. E. 919; Conger v. Lowe (1890), 124 Ind. 368, 24
N. E. 889; Teal v. Richardson (1902), 160 Ind. 119, 66 N. E. 435; Burton
v. Carnahan (1906), 38 Ind. App. 612, 78 N. E. 682; Gibson v. Brown (1916),
62 Ind. App. 460, 110 N. E. 716, 112 N. E. 894.
"It is therefore clear that the rule not only defeats the intention but substitutes a legal intendment directly opposed to the obvious design of the
limitation. A rule which so operates cannot be a rule of construction." Aigler
Cases on Titles (1932), p. 581 (n).
Although the Courts in several states have held that the rule in Shelley's
Case is a rule of law and not one of construction the theory has been advanced that the Rule involves both: Leach's Cases and Materials on Future
Interests (1935), p. 123; 7 Holdsworth, History of English Law pp. 395, 397.
20 "Its operation more frequently defeats the just and undoubted intention
of the grantors and testators than any other effect it has." McIlhinny v. Mc-
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repeatedly stated that the Rule is not to be used as a "device
to discover the testator's intention. ' 21 On the other hand it is
also settled law that "the Rule will not be allowed to defeat
the plain intention of a testator." 22 It might be well to remind
the reader at this point that it is the duty of the Court in
questionable cases first to construe the instrument in question
for the express purpose of ascertaining, if possible, the true
intent of the maker. This having been accomplished, then
the Rule is either invoked or its application denied.
It has been stated that a more liberal construction is accorded wills than deeds, the apparent reason being that courts
are prone to indulge the presumption that a testator is not
in as favorable position to obtain legal advice as a grantor. 28
However, our courts recognize that deeds as well as wills
should be so construed as to bring to light the true intention
of the grantor.

24

Since our courts are more inclined to construe wills liberally
than deeds, it would seem that the courts should more closely
observe the established rules of construction. In one case it
was said, "To ascertain the testator's intention, the whole will
must be considered, and no word or clause in the will is to be
Ilhinny (1893), 137 Ind. 411, 37 N. E. 147; Waters v. Lyon (1894), 141 Ind.
170, 40 N. E. 662; Chamberlain v. Runkle (1901), 28 Ind. App. 599, 63 N. E.
486; Edwards v. Bates (1922), 79 Ind. App. 578, 139 N. E. 192.
21 Conger v. Lowe (1890), 124 Ind. 368, 24 N. E. 889; Edwards v. Bates
(1922), 79 Ind. App. 578, 139 N. E. 192.
22 The cardinal rule in the construction of wills is that the intention of
the testator must control; but it is also true that when words are used that
have a settled legal meaning, full effect must be given to them. Teal v.
Richardson (1902), 160 Ind. 119, 66 N. E. 4-35; Snodgrass v. Brandenburg
(1904), 164 Ind. 59, 71 N. E. 137, 72 N. E. 1030; Hayes v. Martz (1909),
173 Ind. 279, 89 N. E. 303, 90 N. E. 309.
Courts will not allow Rule to defeat the plain intention of a testator. Doe
v. Jackman (1854),.5 Ind. 283; Siceloff v. Redman (1866), 26 Ind. 251; Helen
v. Frisbie (1877), 59 Ind. 526.
23Shimer v. Mann (1884), 99 Ind. 190; Ridgeway v. Lanphear (1884),
99 Ind. 251; Fountain County Coal Co. v. Beckleheimer (1885), 102 Ind. 76,
1 N. E. 202.
24 Goodpaster v. Leathers, (1889), 123 Ind. 121, 23 N. E. 1090; Tinder v.
Tinder (1891), 131 Ind. 381, 30 N. E. 1077; Booker v. Tarwater (1894), 138
Ind. 385, 37 N. E. 979; Evans v. Dunlap (1905), 36 Ind. App. 198, 75 N. E.
297; Adams v. Merrill (1909), 45 Ind. App. 315, 85 N. E. 114, 87 N. E. 36.
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rejected to which a reasonable effect can be given, and that
25
effect must be given to every part of the will if possible."
Other cases hold that "the purpose of construing wills is to
ascertain the intention of the testator, and to carry it out so
26
far as it may not interfere with established rules of law."
Rules of construction are of the utmost importance when
related to the Rule in Shelley's Case. When the Rule is involved, the Court is confronted with the problem of ascertaining the meaning and effect of the word "heirs" or similar
words when used in a deed or will to create a remainder after
a life estate in the ancestor. Otherwise expressed, the court
must interpret such word or words as meaning limitation,
i. e. setting up an estate of inheritance in the ancestor, or
meaning purchase, in which event the remaindermen would be
considered as having been sufficiently described as individuals
or as a class (descriptio personarum) which would entitle
them to take the remainder in fee. The following statement
taken from Taylor v. Cleary (1877), 29 Grat. (Va.) 448,
clearly states the rule:
"Sometimes, we know that the word 'heirs' is used in an instrument,
and especially a will, to describe 'children' or 'issue' or some particular
class of heirs, and sometimes the word 'children' or some other word is
used to describe 'heirs.' This is a question of intention, depending on
the terms of the instrument, construed altogether and in connection with
the surrounding circumstances, or such of them as may be admissible
evidence upon such a question. In deciding the question great weight
must be given to the technical meaning of the word 'heirs' which must
be presumed to have been intended to be used in such technical sense in
the absence of evidence of a plain intention to the contrary.

"If the word 'heirs' was intended to be used in its technical sense, then
the Rule applies, and there is an end of the question in the case. But
if the word was intended to be used as a description or designation of

particular persons who were to take by purchase, in .contradistinction
to those who would take by inheritance, as 'heirs forever', then clearly
25 Fenstermaker v. Holman (1901), 158 Ind. 71, 74, 62 N. E. 699.
26 Snyder v. Greendale Land Co. (1911), 48 Ind. App. 178, 91 N. E. 819;
Wood v. Robertson (1887), 113 Ind. 323, 15 N. E. 457; Underwood v. Robbins
(1888), 117 Ind. 308, 20 N. E. 230; Fowler v. Duhme (1895), 143 Ind. 248,
42 N. E. 623; Mulvane v. Rude (1896), 146 Ind. 476, 45 N. E. 659; Langman
v. Marble (1900), 156 Ind. 330, 58 N. E. 191.
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the Rule in Shelley's Case does not apply; and the persons thus described
as remaindermen are entitled to take by purchase."

The word "heirs" is a powerful one, and it must be given
its legal force- and effect,2 7 unless the words of the instrument
clearly assign it a different meaning 2s and its force is not
impaired by the mere use of negative or restraining words. 29
Redfield on Wills says that "Conjecture, doubt, or even equi-

librium of apparent intention will not suffice." 80 The converse is equally true that technical words may be explained
by superadded words, and where it clearly and unequivocally

appears that the word "heirs" was not used in its technical
sense, it will be assigned the meaning given it by the person
by whom it was used. 8 1 In Tinder v. Tinder (1891), 131
Ind. 381, 383, we find the court admonishing itself by stating
"that rigid adherence to the meaning ascribed by law writers

to the term 'heir' or 'heirs' has resulted in giving many instruments a meaning very different from that intended by their
27Doe v. Jackman (1854), 5 Ind. 283; Siceloff v. Redman (1866), 26 Ind.
251; Nelson v. Davis (1871), 35 Ind. 474.
28 Whenever it is certain that the term heirs is used with the intention that
they should take as children, or as purchasers, the will should be so construed.
Jones v. Miller (1859), 13 Ind. 337; Rapp v. Matthias (1871), 35 Ind. 332;
Brown v. Harmon (1881), 73 Ind. 412; Clifford v. Farmer (1881), 79 Ind. 529.
Strong as is the word "heirs," it may be read to mean "children," if the
context decisively shows that it was employed in that sense by the testator.
Allen v. Craft (1886), 109 Ind. 476, 9 N. E. 919; McCllen v. Sehker (1919),
70 Ind. App. 435, 123 N. E. 475; Hochstedler v. Hochstedler (1886), 108 Ind.
506, 9 N. E. 467.
29 Shimer v. Mann (1884), 99 Ind. 190.
80 "While the intention of the testator, if consistent with law, is undoubtedly
to be the polar star, yet we are bound to take as our guides those general
rules or canons of interpretation which have been adopted and followed by
those who have gone before us. It becomes no man, and no court to be -wise
above that which is written. Security of titles requires that no mere arbitrary
discretion should be exercised in conjecturing what words the teptator would
have used, or what forin of disposition he would have adopted had he been
truly advised as to the legal effect of the words actually employed. That
would be to make a will for him instead of construing that which he had
made." In Doebler's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 9, 15 cited in Teal v. Richardson
(1902), 160 Ind. 119, 122, 66 N. E. 435.
81 Fountain County Coal Co. v. Beckleheimer (1885), 102 Ind. 76, 1 N. E.
202; Shimer v. Mann (1884), 99 Ind. 190, 193 and cases cited, Rapp v. Matthias (1871), 35 Ind. 332; Cleveland v. Spilman (1865), 25 Ind. 95.
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framers. It is not only the unlearned who use the term 'heirs'
as meaning 'children' for the greatest literary men often use
the term as meaning children. And so do the Courts." 82
In addition to the word "heirs" we find other terms which
have fixed legal meanings depending on their use in either a
will or deed. These terms such as "issue"8 3 and "children"8 4
however, like the term "heirs" are subject to construction and
may be interpreted as words of limitation or purchase, depending on the intention of the grantor or devisor.
Classification of Words and Phrases
An endeavor has been made to collect most of the Indiana
cases dealing with the application of the Rule in Shelley's
Case. This classification is an attempt to make available a
digest of words and phrases which have been determined by
the Indiana courts to either invoke or avoid the Rule. In
view of the fact that some words such as "heirs" and "issue"
have been construed as both words of purchase and words of
limitation, depending on their use, it is obviously necessary
to refer to the cases herein cited to ascertain why the court
has or has not invoked the Rule. It is to be observed that
the classification pursues the following order: First, Wills
(a) Words of Purchase, (b) Words of Limitation. Second,
Deeds (a) Words of Purchase, (b) Words of Limitation.
A digest of Indiana cases following this classification is
inserted at the end of this article as an appendix thereto.
32Hull v. Beales (1864), 23 Ind. 25; Ridgeway v. Lanphear (1884), 99
Ind. 251.
83 "When word 'issue' is used in a will it may be a word of limitation
or purchase depending on the testator's intention as expressed in the context.
But when used in a deed it is always a word of purchase." McIlhinny v.
McIlhinny (1893), 137 Ind. 411, 37 N. E. 147.
84 In its primary sense the word "children" when used in a devise, is
always a word of purchase and not a word of limitation. Sorden v. Gatewood (1848), 1 Ind. 107; Nelson v. Davis (1871), 35 Ind. 474; Bonner v.
Bonner (1901), 28 Ind. App. 147, 62 N. E. 497; Edwards v. Bates (1922), 79
Ind. App. 578, 139 N. E. 192.
The word "children" used in a deed has always been held in this court
and the courts of England as a word of purchase and not a word of limitation.
Sorden v. Gatewood (1848), 1 Ind. 107; Doe v. Jackman (1854), 5 Ind. 283;
McIlhinny v. Mcllhinny (1893), 137 Ind. 411, 418, 37 N. E. 147.
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CONCLUSION

It would be folly for anyone to attempt a comprehensive
discussion of the Rule and label such, "The Rule in Shelley's
Case Simplified." It is hoped that the foregoing arrangement
of the subject matter, the digest of cases showing the application of the Rule, and the notes citing authorities, at least
to a small degree, have brought into focus various elements
which may make for a better understanding of the Rule in
Indiana.
The writer suggests that the members of the legal profession in Indiana give serious study to the various statutes
which have been passed in other states which affect the operation of the Rule,3 5 with the view of eventually recommending
to the proper authorities a simplification or complete abolishment of the Rule in this state. To date two-thirds of the
states in America have, wholly or partially, legislated the Rule
out of existence.3 6 England, from whom we inherited the
Rule, by adopting the Common Law of that country, abolished
the Rule by the Acts of 1925, sec. 131.
It will not be seriously contended that the Rule is a necessary rule of property law which may not be amended or
totally abandoned by proper legislation. Further, it is surely
to be admitted that regardless of careful judicial interpretation of a grantor's or testator's intent the harshness of the
Rule, when applied, has a tendency to work and does work
injustice in many cases. As another argument against the Rule
the writer would like to publish some of the vituperative
epithets directed at the Rule which he has heard from lawyers
and law students but propriety forbids. In view of the foregoing arguments and those announced by the Courts and legal
writers it would appear that the legislature in this State would
render a genuine service to the laity as well as the legal pro35 Mr. Richard R. Powell, professor of law at Columbia University, in his
case book on Future Interests (1937), p. 379-382, offers a helpful note on the
Statutory enactments in the United States which affect the application of the
Rule in Shelley's Case in which he classifies the states according to the effect
of their statutes upon the Rule. Also see 45 Harvard Law Review 571.
36 See Note 2 supra.
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fession by abolishing or materially modifying the Rule in
Shelley's Case. It would be hard to believe that thirty-three
states out of forty-eight, which have so acted, could be in error.
APPENDIX
Digest of Indiana Cases Bearing on Rule in Shelley's Case.
WILLS

(a)

Words of Purchase

"Heirs-:

McCray v. Lipp (1871), 35 Ind. 116 (Dissent); Conger v.
Lowe (1890), 124 Ind. 368, 24 N. E. 889.
"Lawful heirs":

Conger et al v. Lowe et al (1890), 124 Ind. 368, 24 N. E. 889.
"Legal heirs":

Underwood et al v. Robbins et al (1888), 117 Ind. 308, 20 N.
E. 230.
"Lawful issue:

Edwards v. Bates (1922), 79 Ind. App. 578, 139 N. E. 192.
"Heirs of his body":

Gibson v. Brown (1916), 62 Ind. App. 460, 112 N. E. 894;
Granger v. Granger (1896), 147 Ind. 95, 44 N. E. 189, 46 N.
E. 80.
"Heirs of their bodies":

Taylor v. Stephens, Administrator, et al (1905), 165 Ind. 200,
74 N. E. 980.
"Children":

Ridgeway et al v. Lanphear et al (1884), 99 Ind. 251; Hayes
v. Martz (1909), 173 Ind. 279, 89 N. E. 303; Stilwell v. Knapper
(1880), 69 Ind. 558; McMahan v. Newcomer (1882), 82 Ind.
565; Abernathy v. McCoy (1930), 91 Ind. App. 574, 154 N. E.
682; Conover v. Cade (1915), 184 Ind. 604, 112 N. E. 7.
"Their children, the heirs of -their bodies forever":

Doe on the demise of Patterson and Another v. Jackman (1854),
5 Ind. 283.
"His children, if he have any; and if he have no children or if there
be no heirs of his body, then * * * to his other heirs of his
own blood equally":

Ridgeway v. Lanphear (1884), 99 Ind. 251.
"Heirs of his body begotten in lawful wedlock":
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"His children begotten in lawful wedlock":
Millett v. Ford (1886), 109 Ind. 159, 8 N. E. 917.
"Issue" and "Children":
Edwards v. Bates (1922), 79 Ind. App. 578, 139 N. E. 192.
"Issue of her body by me begotten":
Helm v. Frisbie (1877), 59 Ind. 526.
"Remainder to X and Y (named heirs)":
Baker v. Riley (1861), 16 Ind. 479.
"Persons who would have inherited the same from X had he owned
the same in fee, simple at the time of his death":
Earnhart v. Earnhart (1890), 127 Ind. 397, 26 N. E. 895.
WILLS

(b) Words of Limitation
"Heirs":
Siceloff v. Redman (1866), 26 Ind. 251; McCray v. Lipp (1871),
35 Ind. 116; Rapp v. Matthias (1871), 35 Ind. 332; Rusing v.
Rusing (1865), 25 Ind. 63.
"Lawful heirs":
Perkins v. McConnell (1893), 136 Ind. 384, 36 N. E. 121.
"Legal heirs":
McCllen v. Sehker (1919), 70 Ind. App. 435, 123 N. E. 475.
"Heirs of her body":
Teal v. Richardson (1902), 160 Ind. 119, 66 N. E. 435.
"Heirs of their body":
Smith v. McCormick (1874), 46 Ind. 135.
"Her heirs in fee":
Bonner v. Bonner (1901), 28 Ind. App. 147, 62 N. E. 497;
Reddick v. Lord (1891), 131 Ind. 336, 30 N. E 1085.
"Respective heirs":
DeLawter v. DeLawter (1929), 90 Ind. App. 571, 169 N. E.

472.
"Heirs forever":
Small v. Howland (1860), 14 Ind. 592;'Allen v. Craft (1886),
109 Ind. 476, 9 N. E. 919.
"His issue or issue of his body":
Gonzales v. Barton (1873), 45 Ind. 295.
"Devisees, who are named, and their lawful heirs":
Hochstedler v. Hochstedler (1886), 108 Ind. 506, 9 N. E. 467.
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DEEDS

(a)

Words of Purchase

"Heirs at law":
Adams et al v. Alexander, Administrator, (1902), 159 Ind. 175,
64 N. E. 597.
"Heirs of the body":
Adams v. Merrill (1909), 45 Ind. App. 315, 85 N. E. 114.
"Heirs of his body":
Doren v. Gillum (1893),

136 Ind. 134, 35 N. E. 1101.

"The heirs of d and B":
Hadlock et al v. Gray (1885),

104 Ind. 596, 4 N. E. 167.

"Heirs of person living":
Tinder v. Tinder et al (1891),

131 Ind. 381, 30 N. E. 1077.

"Present heirs":
The Fountain County Coal and Mining Company v. Beckleheimer et al (1885), 102 Ind. 76, 1 N. E. 202.
(Named heirs) "B and C":
Prior and Another v. Quackenbush (1868), 29 Ind. 475.
" Children":
Sorden v. Gatewood (1848), 1 Ind. 107; Owen et al v. Cooper
(1874), 46 Ind. 524; Amos et al v. Amos et al (1888), 117 Ind.
19, 19 N. E. 539.
"Children of his body then living":
Jackson v. Jackson et al (1890),

127 Ind. 346, 26 N. E. 897.

"Children and their descendants, their heirs and assigns forever."
(Descendants mean "children"):
Snyder et al v. Greendale Land Co. (1911), 48 Ind. App. 178,
91 N. E. 819.
"Issue of her body born alive":
Mcllhinny v. Mcllhinny (1893), 137 Ind. 411, 37 N. E. 147;
(Overruling Fletcher v. Fletcher (1882), 88 Ind. 418, and modify-

ing King v. Rea (1877), 56 Ind. 1.)

DEEDS

(b)
Words of Limitation
"Heirs":
Taney et al v. Fahnley et al (1890), 126 Ind. 88, 25 N. E. 882;
Shoe v. Heckley (1922), 78 Ind. App. 586, 134 N. E. 214; Lee
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et al v. Lee (1909), 45 Ind. App. 645, 91 N. E. 507; Hull v.
Beals (1864), 23 Ind. 25; Booker et al v. Tarwater (1894), 138
Ind. 385, 37 N. E. 979; Winslow et al v. Winslow (1875), 52
Ind. 8.
"His heirs":
Shimer v. Mann (1884), 99 Ind. 190.
"Heirs, of his (her or their) body":
Lane et al v. Utz (1891), 130 Ind. 235, 29 N. E. 772; Waters
et al v. Lyon (1894), 141 Ind. 170, 40 N. E. 662; Dotson v.
Faulkenburg (1917), 186 Ind. 417, 116 N. E. 577; Chamberlain
et al v. Runkle et al (1901), 28 Ind. App. 599, 63 N. E. 486;
Andrews v. Spurlin and others (1871), 35 Ind. 262.
"A and the heirs of her body by B":
Tipton and others v. LaRose (1867), 27 Ind. 484.
"Bodily heirs":
Burton et al v. Carnahan et al (1906), 38 Ind. App. 612, 78
N. E. 682.
"Lawful heirs":
Outland et al v. Bowen et al (1888), 115 Ind. 150, 17 N. E.
281; Hochstedler et al v. Hoehstedler et al (1886), 108 Ind. 506,
9 N. E. 467.
"Legitimate heirs":
Lamb et al v. Medsker et al (1905), 35 Ind.- App. 662, 74 N.
E. 1012.
"Respective heirs":
De Lawter v. De Lawter et al (1929), 90 Ind. App. 571, 169
N. E. 472.
"Heirs and assigns forever":
Newhaus et al v. Brennan et al (1911), 49 Ind. App. 654, 97
N. E. 938.
"Issue" (Used without explanatory words):
Edwards v. Bates (1922), 79 Ind. App. 578, 139 N. E. 192.
"Issue of her body, their heirs and assigns forever":
King v. Rea (1877), 56 Ind. 1. Modified by Mcllhinny v.
Mcllhinny (1893), 137 Ind. 411, 37 N. E. 147.
"Children" (Grantees had no children at time of grant, but subsequently children were born):
Fletcher v. Fletcher (1882), 88 Ind. 418. (Overruled by McIlhinny v. McIlhinny (1893), 137 Ind. 411, 37 N. E. 147.)

